Whistleblower’s Delight: An Evaluation of the Third Circuit Decision in \u3cem\u3eFoglia v. Renal Ventures\u3c/em\u3e by Venter, Patrick
Boston College Law Review
Volume 56
Issue 6 Electronic Supplement Article 15
5-13-2015
Whistleblower’s Delight: An Evaluation of the
Third Circuit Decision in Foglia v. Renal Ventures
Patrick Venter
Boston College Law School, patrick.venter@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, and the Health Law and
Policy Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation




WHISTLEBLOWER’S DELIGHT: AN 
EVALUATION OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
DECISION IN FOGLIA v. RENAL VENTURES 
Abstract: In 2014, in Foglia v. Renal Ventures Management LLC, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit evaluated the pleading requirements needed to 
satisfy Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, within the context of 
False Claims Act complaints. The Third Circuit concurred with the First, Fifth, 
and Ninth Circuits and determined that it is necessary to provide only reliable in-
dicia that leads to a strong inference of a scheme to submit false claims. This is in 
opposition to the holdings of some Circuits, which have required complaints to 
allege specific times, places, contents of acts, and identity of actors. This Com-
ment argues the Third Circuit applied the correct standard because the require-
ment of advanced specificity at the initial pleading stage presents an unreasona-
ble hurdle to whistleblowers seeking discovery. 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Department of Justice’s prosecution of the False Claims Act 
(“FCA”) has been an important aspect of the government enforcement land-
scape in recent years.1 Congress developed the FCA to identify and prevent the 
submission of fraudulent claims for reimbursement made to the U.S. govern-
ment through the implementation of citizen whistleblowers.2 After a citizen 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012) (listing acts for which liability could be imposed under the False 
Claims Act statute); see also, e.g., Justice Department Recovers Nearly $6 Billion from False Claims 
Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2014, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/justice-department-recovers-nearly-6-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2014, archived at 
https://perma.cc/XVG6-TCTP?type=image (acknowledging that 2014 marked a new record recovery 
under the FCA); Justice Department Recovers $3.8 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal 
Year 2013, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/December/
13-civ-1352.html, archived at https://perma.cc/3X8Y-BSYW?type=image (describing 2013 as a ban-
ner year for civil fraud recoveries, including $2.6 billion in health care fraud recoveries); Justice De-
partment Recovers Nearly $5 Billion in False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2012, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-ag-1439.html, archived at 
https://perma.cc/W9HY-BHVP?type=image (highlighting the 2012 recoveries as a symbol of the 
Obama administration’s commitment to fraud prevention and recovery of civil claims); Justice De-
partment Recovers $3 Billion in False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2011, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
(Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-civ-1665.html, archived at https://
perma.cc/52LV-P3QL?type=image (expressing the integral role played by whistleblowers in allowing 
for unveiling of fraudulent activities and civil remedies to reclaim fraudulent reimbursements). 
 2 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (prohibiting a person or entity from knowingly presenting to the 
U.S. government a false or fraudulent claim for payment, and allowing for an individual to bring suit 
on behalf of the U.S. government); Daniel Long, Comment, Last Call: According First-Filed Qui Tam 
Complaints Greater Preclusive Effect Under Batiste’s Narrow Interpretation of the First-to-File Rule, 
196 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
files a claim, the responsibility then falls to the Attorney General to investigate 
the alleged violation and determine whether to bring a civil action.3 
As a response to a plaintiff’s claim in FCA litigation, defendants have an 
opportunity to present a defense under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.4 Generally, the rules of pleading must state a general claim for relief 
and present allegations which are plausible on their face.5 When evaluating 
FCA complaints which allege fraud, the plaintiff’s claims are required to meet 
an elevated standard requiring particularity.6 In 2013, in Foglia v. Renal Ven-
tures Management LLC (Foglia II), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held that in order to meet the heightened pleading requirement outlined 
in Rule 9(b), a plaintiff only needed to allege facts that establish a strong infer-
ence that false claims were submitted.7 
This Comment argues that the Third Circuit set an appropriate bar for 
plaintiffs to reach discovery for false claims.8 Part I of this Comment addresses 
the requirements of an FCA complaint, the various ways in which circuit 
courts have interpreted the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b), and the fac-
tual background in Foglia.9 Part II discusses the decision in Foglia II and the 
“strong inference” standard applied to the facts of the case by the Third Cir-
cuit.10 Part III argues that the Third Circuit was correct in declining to interpret 
                                                                                                                           
54 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 161, 161–62 (2013), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol54/iss6/13/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/9XNS-BXTD. 
 3 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (delegating to the U.S. Attorney General the responsibility of investi-
gating alleged violations and bringing civil action under 31 U.S.C. § 3730). 
 4 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (delineating plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted as an assertable defense); Lovelace v. Software Spectrum Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1021 (5th 
Cir. 1996) (affirming district court’s dismissal of securities fraud claims when facts alleged failed to 
indicate that the defendant engaged in conscious fraudulent behavior). 
 5 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (establishing the general rules of pleading in Civil Procedure); Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007) (holding that allegations made by plaintiffs of 
parallel anti-competitive conduct were insufficient to meet the standards of Rule 8(a)(2) because the 
presented facts were insufficient to state a claim for relief that was plausible on its face); see also 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (providing courts the discretion to use judicial experience 
and common sense in making determinations as to whether a plausible claim for relief is stated in a 
given complaint). 
 6 See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a 
person’s mind may be alleged generally.”). 
 7 754 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 2014) (adopting a lenient pleading standard that requires plaintiff to 
plead only facts sufficient to establish a strong inference that false claims were submitted). 
 8 See infra notes 50–63 and accompanying text; see also Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 153 (establishing 
the requirement that plaintiff, in pleading sufficient particularity, must allege details of scheme and 
reliable indicia that support a strong inference that false claims were submitted). 
 9 See infra notes 12–32 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 33–49 and accompanying text. 
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Rule 9(b) in a manner that would have required all plaintiffs to produce com-
plaints with an unreasonable level of specificity related to the alleged fraud.11 
I. FACTUAL REQUIREMENTS NEEDED TO CONSTITUTE A FALSE CLAIM  
AND BACKGROUND OF FOGLIA CASE 
Due to the fact that the financial payouts for FCA claims are often enor-
mous, adopting an appropriate standard for determining the required factual 
specificity for an FCA pleader is critical.12 Section A of this Part describes the 
types of claims and the standard of pleading required by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.13 Section B analyzes the differing interpretations held by dif-
ferent circuits.14 Finally, Section C presents a brief factual background of 
Foglia.15 
A. Federal False Claims Act Includes Legally Fraudulent and Factually 
False Claims, And Requires Heightened Level of Pleading 
The FCA prohibits the submission of false or fraudulent claims to the 
government and authorizes private individuals bringing a lawsuit on behalf of 
the government to retain a portion of any resulting damages award.16 An FCA 
claim must allege that the defendant submitted either a legally fraudulent or 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See infra notes 50–63 and accompanying text; see also Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 153 (noting that it 
is hard to reconcile the text of the FCA with the more particular standard required by various circuits). 
 12 See United States ex rel. Thorpe v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, No. CIV. A. 03-10641-RWZ, 2012 
WL 5361036, at *1 (D. Mass. Nov. 1, 2012) (acknowledging the multimillion dollar payout to whis-
tleblowers stemming from FCA complaints against GlaxoSmithKline and subsequent settlement of 
contested civil claims); Peter Loftus, Invoking Anti-Fraud Law, Louisiana Doctor Gets Rich, WALL 
ST. J., July 24, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/invoking-anti-fraud-law-louisiana-doctor-gets-rich-
1406169003, archived at https://perma.cc/EG4J-9UF2?type=pdf (profiling a Louisiana doctor who 
has received $38 million in government rewards for his efforts as a whistleblower over the course of 
two decades); Glaxo to Plead Guilty, Will Pay $3 Billion Stemming from Drug Marketing, LEXISNEXIS 
LEGAL NEWSROOM (July 2, 2012), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/litigation/b/litigation-
blog/archive/2012/07/02/glaxo-to-plead-guilty-will-pay-3-billion-stemming-from-drug-marketing.aspx, 
archived at https://perma.cc/ZFN2-QFNS?type=image (noting that GlaxoSmithKline’s settlement 
included a $2 billion payment related to FCA complaints alleged by plaintiffs Greg Thorpe and Blair 
Hamrick); see also United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1301 (11th Cir. 
2002) (affirming dismissal of FCA complaint filed by medical testing corporation’s competitor on the 
basis that the claims alleged by plaintiff were insufficient to show particularity of scheme to engage in 
duplicative testing and unnecessary billing). 
 13 See infra notes 16–21 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 22–26 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 27–32 and accompanying text. 
 16 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012) (establishing civil liability of at least $5,000 plus three times 
the amount of damages sustained by the government for any individual who knowingly makes false 
statement or record to the government); Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt. LLC (Foglia I), 830 F. 
Supp. 2d 8, 14 (D.N.J. 2011) (noting that the FCA employs qui tam actions to empower private indi-
viduals to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the government in exchange for a right to a portion of resulting 
damages award). 
198 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
false claim.17 A factually false claim is related to reimbursement request for an 
incorrect description of goods or services provided.18 A legally false claim is 
when a recipient of government funds has certified compliance with a statute 
or regulation as a condition of payment, yet knowingly failed to comply with 
that same statute or regulation.19 
In a complaint alleging a violation of the FCA, a claimant must meet the 
higher pleading requirements set by Rule 9(b) as opposed to a general pleading 
standard required by Rule 8(a).20 Rule 9(b) requires a party pleading a special 
matter, such as fraud, to state with particularity the circumstances constituting 
fraud or mistake.21 
B. Circuit Split Related to Required Level of Particularity 
In regards to Rule 9(b) pleading generally, the Third Circuit has held that 
it requires plaintiffs to plead alleged fraud with enough particularity to ensure 
that defendants are placed on notice of the misconduct with which they are 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Foglia I, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 16; see United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., 
Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1217 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that the plaintiff-whistleblower’s failure to allege 
a legally fraudulent or legally false claim was fatal to an evaluation of the plaintiff’s claim); see also 
United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 305 (3d Cir. 2011) (highlight-
ing the distinction between legally and factually false claims). 
 18 See, e.g., Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 153,157 (identifying claim that dialysis company inflated their 
use of particular medication to seek fraudulent reimbursement as a factually false claim); Conner, 543 
F.3d at 1217 (describing factually false claims as straightforward situations wherein the government 
payee submitted an incorrect description of goods or services provided); Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 
687, 703 (2d Cir. 2001) (describing a claim for worthless services as a derivative of factually false 
claims because it seeks reimbursement for service not provided). 
 19 See, e.g., Conner, 543 F. 3d at 1211 (holding that hospital’s allegedly false certification that it 
was in compliance with Medicare statutes could not form basis for cause of action); Mikes, 274 F.3d 
at 694, 696–97 (categorizing plaintiff’s allegation that Medicare reimbursement claims were not per-
formed in accordance with American Thoracic Society guidelines as a legally false claim); Foglia I, 
830 F. Supp. 2d at 16, 21 (describing legally false claims as instances where a payee has certified 
compliance yet knowingly failed to comply with government regulation and finding that plaintiff 
failed to state a claim under the express or implied false certification theory of legally false claims).  
 20 See Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The FCA is an anti-fraud 
statute. As such, we hold that complaints brought under the FCA must fulfill the requirements of Rule 
9(b)—defendants accused of defrauding the federal government have the same protection as defend-
ants sued for fraud in other contexts.”). Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (requiring a short and plain 
statement of jurisdiction and relief sought), with FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a 
party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, 
knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”). 
 21 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).  Regarding FCA cases: 
Every major federal court of appeals has held that because the essence of a False 
Claims Act case is fraud, Rule 9(b) applies to FCA cases. As a result, plaintiffs in FCA 
cases, whether the government, qui tam plaintiff, or both, must make far more detailed 
allegation in FCA complaints than in most litigation. 
JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS § 5.04 (2014). 
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charged, and to safeguard defendants against unsubstantiated charges of 
fraud.22 
Within the subset of Rule 9(b) claims pertaining to the FCA, prior to 
Foglia, the Third Circuit had not weighed in on what standard of particularity 
is required in FCA cases.23 The various circuit courts have disagreed as to what 
level of specificity is required in order to satisfy the particularity requirement 
of Rule 9(b) with regards to FCA claims.24 The Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Eleventh Circuits have required specificity related to time, place, contents of 
acts, and identity of actors.25 In contrast, the First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits 
have held that it is sufficient for a plaintiff to allege only enough details of a 
scheme and reliable indicia that leads to a strong inference that false claims 
were actually submitted.26 
                                                                                                                           
 22 Craftmatic Sec. Litig. v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628, 645 (3d Cir. 1989); see Seville Indus. Ma-
chinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 791 (3d Cir. 1984) (ruling that plaintiff 
pleas are designed to safeguard defendant against spurious charge, but that nothing in Rule 9(b) re-
quires information pertaining to date, place, or time). 
 23 Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 153 (explicitly identifying the court’s analysis related to the particularity 
requirement of FCA claims as a matter of first impression). 
 24 Id. at 155 (acknowledging the contrast between the standard used by the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth 
and Eleventh Circuits on one hand, and by the First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits on the other); see False 
Claims Act/Qui Tam Actions, 26 BUS. TORTS REP. 282, 282 (2014) (commenting on the federal circuit 
split related to the details required to satisfy particularity requirement, and describing the approach in 
Foglia as more liberal than other courts). 
 25 Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 155–56 (summarizing the varying interpretations employed by varying 
circuits in regards to their analysis of Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement); see, e.g., United States ex 
rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 455, 457–58 (4th Cir. 2013) (explicitly 
disagreeing with the relaxed construction of Rule 9(b) used in some circuits), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 
1759 (2014); United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 510 (6th Cir. 
2007) (holding that a fraudulent scheme with a high level of generality reaching discovery would 
disallow defendants from receiving the protection of notice for charges brought against them); United 
States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 557 (8th Cir. 2006) (ruling that allegations 
of false billing submitted by a doctor did not meet the particularity requirement because details of 
time, place, content of act, and identity of actors was not provided); Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1312, 1315 
(determining that claims lacking actual dates and information regarding billing policies did not meet 
minimum pleading requirements). 
 26 Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 156 (offering a background summary of the circuits adopting an interpre-
tative approach most similar to the standard eventually adopted by the court); see, e.g., Ebeid ex rel. 
United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2010) (refusing to embrace a categorical 
approach that would require examples of false claims to support every allegation and adopting flexible 
standard that requires only reliable indicia that leads to a strong inference of false claims being sub-
mitted); United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 29–30 (1st Cir. 
2009) (applying flexible standard to submission of false claims by eight healthcare providers and 
determining that adequate information was provided to satisfy 9(b)); United States ex rel. Grubbs v. 
Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the notion that time, place, contents of acts, 
and identity of actors are required elements of successfully meeting the particularity standard of 9(b)). 
200 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
C. Factual Background in Foglia 
In 2011, in Foglia I, the U.S. District Court of New Jersey evaluated a qui 
tam claim alleging that Renal Ventures Management (“defendant”), a dialysis 
care services company, submitted false claims for Medicare funds.27 This claim 
was submitted by the whistleblower Thomas G. Foglia (“plaintiff”)—a regis-
tered nurse at the defendant’s dialysis center in Sewell, New Jersey from 
March 13, 2007 to November 7, 2008.28 
The plaintiff argued that the defendant improperly used and billed for 
Zemplar, a prescription medication used to treat kidney disease.29 The plaintiff 
also claimed that the defendant violated the FCA by accepting federal funds 
stemming from the improper administration of dialysis services.30 
The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s second amended complaint, 
and the plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claim in relation to the over-
billing of Zemplar.31 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed 
the district court’s dismissal of the factually false claim portion and remanded 
to the district court for further proceedings.32 
                                                                                                                           
 27 830 F. Supp. 2d at 10. Qui tam provisions exist to give “whistleblowers” the right to file claims 
on behalf of the U.S. government. Long, supra note 2, at 162. “Qui tam” is a Latin term that is part of 
a longer phrase translating to “who as well sues for the king as for himself sues in this matter.” Id. 
(citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1368 (9th ed. 2009)). 
 28 Foglia I, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 10. 
 29 Id. at 11. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendant re-used single dose Zemplar containers 
for injectable medications, in violation of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) clinical recommenda-
tions. Id. Plaintiff alleged that defendant submitted factually false claims seeking federal reimburse-
ment for up to fifty vials of Zemplar per day when only twenty-nine to thirty-five were actually used. 
Id. at 12. But, importantly, the plaintiff failed to offer support that both the manufacturer and the FDA 
clinically recommended providers to discard unused portions of Zemplar containers. Id. at 20. 
 30 Id. at 17–18. Pursuant to the New Jersey Administrative Code, dialysis centers are required to 
staff their facilities with at least one registered nurse for every nine patients receiving dialysis ser-
vices, and at least one registered nurse, practical nurse, or trained patient care technician for every 
three patients receiving dialysis services. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 8:43A-24.7 (2014); Foglia I, 830 F. 
Supp. 2d at 10–11. The Plaintiff alleged—and listed by date—several occasions of inadequate nurse 
to staff ratio and other failures to comply with these state regulations. Foglia I, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 11. 
The court noted, however, that the plaintiff failed to identify a rule, regulation, or other source that 
requires compliance with New Jersey’s regulations to obtain payment from the federal government. 
Id. at 20. 
 31 Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 153, 155. The plaintiff’s appeal centered on the reuse of Zemplar vials in 
order to fraudulently receive an inflated reimbursement from the government—a factually false claim. 
Id. at 157; see supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text (describing legally fraudulent and legally 
false claims as the two types of FCA complaints). 
 32 See Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 158. In Foglia, the factually false claim was related to the amount of 
Zemplar that was administered to patients. See id. 
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II. APPELLATE COURT REVIEW AND THIRD CIRCUIT’S APPROPRIATE 
APPLICATION OF 9(B) INTERPRETATION AND STRONG  
INFERENCE APPROACH TO FOGLIA 
In 2014, in Foglia v. Renal Ventures Management LLC (Foglia II), the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined, as a matter of first im-
pression, their interpretation of Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement for FCA 
claims.33 Section A of this Part addresses the Third Circuit’s interpretation of 
Rule 9(b) within this FCA-specific context.34 Section B of this Part describes 
the Third Circuit’s application of their interpretation to the facts in Foglia and 
the court’s conclusion based on that application.35 
A. Third Circuit Analysis: Required Particularity 
The degree of particularity required in an FCA complaint was an issue of 
first impression for the Third Circuit in this case.36 One standard of particulari-
ty adopted by the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits requires that a 
plaintiff show “representative samples” in the complaint, including specific 
information regarding time, place, content of the acts, and identity of actors.37 
A different—more plaintiff-friendly standard—has been accepted by the First, 
Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, which allows general details of a scheme to be suffi-
cient, so long as these details establish for a strong inference that false claims 
were submitted.38 
                                                                                                                           
 33 754 F.3d 153, 153 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 34 See infra notes 36–42 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 43–49 and accompanying text. 
 36 Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 153. 
 37 See, e.g., id. at 155–56 (landscaping the heightened standard of particularity required by the 
Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits); United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 
707 F.3d 451, 455, 457–58 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that some indicia of reliability must be provided 
to support the allegation that a false claim was presented to the government), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
1759 (2014); United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 510 (6th Cir. 
2007) (asserting that a “clear and unequivocal” requirement of 9(b) and the statutory text of the FCA 
is the allegation of specific false claims); United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 
F.3d 1301, 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding a failure to allege specificity in regards to if and 
when improper claims were submitted to the government fatal in evaluating employee’s allegations 
toward medical testing service provider against standard of 9(b)). 
 38 Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 156; see, e.g., Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 
998–99 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that details of false claims related by physician against health care 
businesses were not sufficiently detailed to create reliable indicia leading to a strong inference that 
claims were actually submitted); United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 
F.3d 13, 29–30 (1st Cir. 2009) (determining the claims made by sales representatives against pharma-
ceutical distributing company to satisfy 9(b) because the details of “who, what, where, and when” 
were provided, although no specific claims were identified); United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanne-
ganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009) (ruling that 9(b) is context-specific and may survive without 
alleging details of an actually submitted false claim so long as there is reliable indicia that leads to a 
strong inference of claims actually being submitted). 
202 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
The Third Circuit noted that the text of the FCA does not require that the 
exact content of the false claims in question be shown.39 Additionally, the court 
determined that the primary purpose of Rule 9(b) is to provide defendants with 
fair notice of plaintiffs’ claims, not to delineate every specific detail of fraud.40 
Therefore, the Third Circuit concluded that requiring particular details of 
fraudulent acts, including time, place, and identity of actors would create too 
high of a pleading burden for plaintiffs.41 Instead, the court joined the First, 
Fifth, and Ninth Circuits by adopting the requirement that a complaint must 
allege sufficient details of a scheme to submit false claims paired with reliable 
indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims were actually submitted.42 
B. Application of Strong Inference Standard in Foglia 
Presuming the allegations as true, the Third Circuit addressed the allega-
tions of fraud made by the plaintiff.43 First, the court evaluated the details of 
the complaint purported by the plaintiff, and noted the plausibility of the pur-
ported scheme.44 Specifically, the court noted that Medicare reimburses for a 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 156; see United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 
F.3d 295, 308 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that the Third Circuit has never required that a plaintiff must 
identify a specific claim for payment at the pleading stage); see also 31 U.S C. § 3729(a)–(g) (2012) 
(addressing the sorts of acts that create liability for False Claims, but not providing particulars related 
to the required allegations of a False Claim at the pleading stage). 
 40 See Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 156; see also FED R. CIV. P. 9(b); Ebeid, 616 F.3d at 999 (holding 
that a plaintiff must allege enough detail to give a defendant notice of particular misconduct so that 
the defendant may defend against the charge and not just deny all wrongdoing). 
 41 Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 156; see Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190 (stating that satisfying Rule 9(b) is 
context-specific, and a plaintiff may sufficiently state circumstances constituting fraud without meet-
ing any particular court-appointed standard). As further support for this conclusion, the Third Circuit 
acknowledged that in a brief for a False Claims case, the Solicitor General specifically noted that 
pleading the details of a specific false claim presented to the government is not a necessary require-
ment of a viable FCA complaint. Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 156 (quoting Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae at 10–11, Nathan, 707 F.3d 451 (No. 12-1349), 2014 WL 709660, at *10–11). 
 42 Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 157–58 (quoting Grubbs, 656 F.3d at 190); see Ebeid, 616 F.3d at 998–
99 (joining the Fifth Circuit in concluding that under Rule 9(b) it is sufficient to provide details lead-
ing to a reasonable conclusion that false claims were actually submitted); Duxbury, 579 F.3d at 30 
(determining that facts supported a strong inference that false claims were actually submitted to satisfy 
Rule 9(b)). 
 43 Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 157; see Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 
1363 (3d Cir. 1992) (declaring that inferences should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party); Scotece v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 322 F. Supp. 2d, 680, 680 (E.D. Va. 2004) 
(holding that the court’s duty in deciding motion to dismiss is to draw all assumptions that are reason-
able in favor of the non-moving party). Specifically, plaintiff claimed that defendant submitted inflat-
ed receipts to the government pertaining to defendant’s use of Zemplar, a prescription medication 
used to treat kidney disease. Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 157–58. As evidence of this, plaintiff provided 
patient logs that suggested defendant was inaccurately reporting the amount of Zemplar actually used 
on patients, in order to seek fraudulent reimbursement from the government. See id. at 158. 
 44 Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 158 (acknowledging the fact that the Medicare policy of reimbursing for 
a full vial of Zemplar, regardless of whether the whole vial is used, was a plausible incentive to fraud-
ulently re-use vials); see FED R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (establishing the general rules of pleading in Civil 
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full vial of Zemplar regardless of whether all Zemplar is used and, therefore, 
there is a fraudulent incentive to re-use Zemplar vials and report to the gov-
ernment that new vials were used for each patient.45 In addition to this incen-
tive, patient logs showed that less Zemplar was being used than if vials were 
administered with single uses.46 
Second, the court viewed the complaint as giving the defendant notice of 
the specific charges against it, as required by Rule 9(b).47 The alleged scheme 
was clear and offered enough specificity to provide the defendant with an op-
portunity to refute the allegations of fraud.48 Based on these two observations, 
the court held that the plaintiff alleged particular details of a scheme to submit 
false claims, paired with reliable indicia leading to a strong inference that false 
claims were actually submitted.49 
III. ESTABLISHING A STANDARD FOR FALSE CLAIMS ACT COMPLAINTS TO 
SURVIVE DISMISSAL 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s 2014 decision to adopt a 
lenient pleading standard in Foglia v. Renal Ventures Management LLC 
(Foglia II) should be adopted by other circuits, because it is a sound decision, 
both from a textual perspective and a policy standpoint.50 First, the Third Cir-
cuit’s analysis in Foglia II is consistent with a literal interpretation of Rule 
                                                                                                                           
Procedure); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007) (holding that allegations made 
by plaintiffs of parallel anti-competitive conduct were insufficient to meet the standards of 8(a)(2) 
because the presented facts were insufficient to state a claim for relief that was plausible on its face); 
see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (providing courts the discretion to use judicial 
experience and common sense in making determinations as to whether a plausible claim for relief is 
stated in a given complaint). 
 45 Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 158 (detailing the Medicare reimbursement plan for Zemplar vials and 
acknowledging that the scheme presented by plaintiff is supported by a structural incentive to inflate 
re-use Zemplar vials and inflate reimbursements). 
 46 See id.; supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing supporting facts under that plaintiff 
made false claims, including documentation of patient logs). 
 47 Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 158; supra note 22 and accompanying text (noting that it is a requirement 
of some circuit courts—including the Third Circuit—that plaintiff in pleading fraud generally, must 
provide enough details to put defendant on notice of the specific conduct being alleged); see FED. R. 
CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may 
be alleged generally.”). 
 48 See Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 158 (concluding that plaintiff provided sufficient facts to satisfy Rule 
9(b) and therefore to survive a 12(b)(6) dismissal motion); supra note 45 and accompanying text (rec-
ognizing the presence of financial incentives to engage in fraudulent activity within the plaintiff’s 
alleged scheme). 
 49 See Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 158 (noting that plaintiff provided sufficient facts to meet the plead-
ing requirements of Rule 9(b)); supra note 41 and accompanying text (grouping the Third Circuit 
alongside the First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits as circuits with a more lenient standard for pleading 
plausibility in FCA cases). 
 50 See infra notes 51–63 and accompanying text. 
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9(b), as well as the text of the FCA: Rule 9(b) provides no requirements for 
particularity of identifying information, and the text of the FCA offers no indi-
cation that this level of specificity is required.51 
Furthermore, the Foglia II decision offers a more reasonable bar to dis-
covery than a standard forcing plaintiffs to allege highly specific details related 
to time, place, contents of acts, and identity of actors at the pleading stage.52 
Ultimately, because it is a civil provision, a plaintiff alleging an FCA violation 
must ultimately prove the claim by a preponderance of the evidence.53 There-
fore, in a trial situation, a reasonable jury could analyze a scheme as well as 
supporting indicia and provide relief, so long as it was determined to be more 
likely than not that a false claim was submitted.54 
The Third Circuit decision in Foglia II, although acknowledging that the 
facts presented a “close case scenario,” offers a manageable standard for plain-
tiffs seeking discovery within its jurisdiction.55 The Foglia II court was appro-
priately persuaded by the construction used by the Solicitor General, who ar-
gued that 9(b) may be satisfied without alleging dates and contents of false 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See 754 F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that the text of the FCA does not require the exact 
content of the false claims in question to be shown); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)–(g) (2012) (ne-
glecting to offer any specific information as to what level of detail is required in order to satisfy the 
requirements of the FCA statute); FED R. CIV. P. 9(b) (requiring that plaintiff state with particularity 
only the “circumstances constituting fraud or mistake”); Aaron Rubin, To Present Bills or Not To 
Present? An In-Depth Analysis of the Burden of Pleading in Qui Tam Suits, 8 SETON HALL CIRCUIT 
REV. 467, 503 (2012) (applauding the generally relaxed pleading standard in FCA scenarios). 
 52 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, United States ex rel. Hopper v. Solvay Pharm., 588 F.3d 
1318 (2009) (No. 091065), 2010 WL 2771705, at *5 (explaining that decisions which impose a strict 
interpretation of Rule 9(b) apply an iron grasp far exceeding the intended reach of the Federal Rule, 
and impose an impossible pleading burden on petitioners). Notably, influential legal scholars Chief 
Judge Easterbrook and Judge Posner have also identified with the opinion that requiring details of a 
specific claim weaken the force of qui tam litigation. Id. at 4–5 (“As Chief Judge Easterbrook, joined 
by Judge Posner, noted in Lusby . . . the requirement that details of a specific claim must be pled 
‘takes a big bite out of qui tam litigation.’” (quoting United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 
570 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2009))); see United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 
189 (5th Cir. 2009) (asserting that if FCA claims are adjudicated under a strict interpretation of Rule 
9(b), a plaintiff is required to plead a level of detail commensurate to that required to prevail at trial on 
the merits). 
 53 See UMC Electronics Co. v. United States, 249 F.3d 1337, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (establishing 
a preponderance of the evidence standard as the required level of proof for False Claims Act and Con-
tract Disputes Act cases). 
 54 See Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 189–90 (asserting that a reasonable civil jury could determine prepon-
derance standard was met based on inferences and indicia, even if the facts fell short of satisfying the 
pleading standard for an illegal act). 
 55 See Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 158 (suggesting that the level of facts provided by plaintiff barely 
met the requirements to satisfy Rule 9(b)). The Solicitor General has applauded this interpretation of 
Rule 9(b). Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 41, at 10–11 (“Several courts of 
appeal have correctly held that a qui tam complaint satisfies Rule 9(b) if it contains detailed allega-
tions supporting a plausible inference that false claims were submitted to the government even if the 
complaint does not identify specific requests for payment.”). 
2015] The Third Circuit Examines the False Claims Act 205 
claims.56 The Third Circuit adopted this ideal, with the additional comment 
that this “nuanced” interpretation favored by the Solicitor General is appropri-
ate, so long as a complaint provides sufficient detail to give defendants fair 
notice of the plaintiffs’ claims.57 
In contrast, forcing a whistleblower to allege details with such a height-
ened level of specificity provides an unrealistic bar to discovery, and creates a 
level of proof that exceeds that required in adjudication at a trial setting.58 Un-
der a strict application of Rule 9(b) at the pleading stage, situations arise where 
even in light of compelling statistical probability that fraudulent claims were 
submitted, a plaintiff is unable to proceed to discovery.59 As a result, those cir-
cuits requiring specificity as to time, place, contents of acts, and identity of 
actors have established a bar to discovery that exceeds the preponderance of 
the evidence standard applied at adjudication.60 
Lastly, it is worth noting that FCA cases typically end in settlement, 
meaning that the determination of whether Rule 9(b) has been satisfied holds a 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See 754 F.3d at 156–57; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 41, at 10–11 
(labeling a per se rule requiring dates and contents of false claims as an interpretation that undermines 
the FCA’s effectiveness, and stating that 9(b) may be satisfied without this strict requirement). The 
Solicitor General noted that even some courts that had initially required satisfaction of the per se re-
quirement have deviated and adopted a more “nuanced” approach. Brief for the United States as Ami-
cus Curiae, supra note 41, at 10; see supra note 37 and accompanying text (outlining the application 
of the alternative, strict standard for pleading plausibility used by the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh 
Circuits). 
 57 See Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 156–57 (commenting that the purpose of Rule 9(b) is to provide 
defendants with fair notice of plaintiffs’ claims, and so long as the relaxed pleading standard satisfies 
that purpose, it is a sufficient approach); see also Sean Wajert, Class Action on Smoke Detectors Dis-
missed: All Smoke No Fire, MASSTORTDEFENSE (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.masstortdefense.com/
tags/rule-9/, archived at http://perma.cc/L685-UHZW (“One of the cardinal purposes of Rule 9(b) is 
to ‘provid[e] a defendant fair notice of plaintiff’s claim, to enable preparation of [a] defense.’” (quot-
ing DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 822 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir. 1987))). 
 58 See Foglia II, 754 F.3d at 156; Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 189–90 (noting that the exact dollar 
amount, billing numbers or dates do not need to be provided; requiring these details at pleading is a 
level of proof not necessarily demanded to win, even at trial); Charis Ann Mitchell, A Fraudulent 
Scheme’s Particularity Under Rule 9(B) Of The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 LIBERTY U. L. 
REV. 337, 374 (2010) (arguing that when a court demands the relation of a specific claim from a 
plaintiff, the plaintiff is never able to satisfy that standard); see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 
F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that standards of pleading an illegal act do not hold identical 
requirement as standard required to prove an illegal act). 
 59 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 52, at 16 (noting that even in the presence of an 
illegal marketing campaign that drove Medicaid reimbursements to be tripled, a strict interpretation of 
Rule 9(b) did not allow for any inference that false claims were submitted; thus, plaintiff could not 
proceed to discovery). 
 60 See Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190 (asserting that plaintiffs should not be required to provide a level 
of detail that exceeds that required at adjudication); supra note 37 and accompanying text (outlining 
the strict interpretation of requirements needed to survive dismissal, as applied in the Fourth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits). 
206 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
heightened significance in the eventual outcome of a specific suit.61 Applying 
an unreasonable bar to discovery would detract from the policy goal of the 
FCA and prevent private citizens from playing an important role in the protec-
tion of government funds.62 For the aforementioned reasons, the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision in Foglia II should serve as a guide both to other circuits, as 
well as the U.S. Supreme Court, should the Court choose to intervene.63 
CONCLUSION 
The standards established in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) as well 
as the False Claims Act do not delineate a specific level of particularity as be-
ing required. Additionally, the preponderance of the evidence standard applied 
at trial adjudication assumes that juries evaluate evidence and make inferences 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Latham’s Lauer on Defending False Claims Act Cases, 22 CORP. CRIME REP., Feb. 25, 2008, at 
3, available at http://www.lw.com/mediacoverage/lathams-lauer-on-defending-false-claims-act-cases, 
archived at https://perma.cc/8UFL-DP3G?type=pdf (noting that FCA cases rarely go to trial, and 
typically end in a government-negotiated settlement). Because FCA cases almost always settle before 
trial, the court’s decision at the pleading stage ends up determining whether a plaintiff will recover 
damages, and in a sense becomes a de facto adjudication. See generally id. (expounding on the idea 
that there are rarely opportunities for in-court advocacy in FCA cases). 
 62 Rubin, supra note 51, at 471–72 (noting that Congress believed the only way to stop schemes 
to defraud public funds was to mobilize private citizens to bring forward civil suits alleging fraud); see 
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2012) (establishing the role played by private individuals in brining civil 
actions on behalf of the United States government); S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266 (arguing that American taxpayers lose millions of dollars each year as a 
result of false claims, and modern FCA legislation is needed to protect the defrauded taxpayer); see 
also Erwin Chemerinsky, Controlling Fraud Against the Government: The Need for Decentralized 
Enforcement, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 1014 (1983) (arguing for the desirability of a system 
based partly on citizen-initiated civil litigation, due to the limited agency resources and motives of 
prosecutors). 
 63 See supra notes 50–62 and accompanying text (arguing in support of the Third Circuit’s adop-
tion of a lenient pleading standard in Foglia II). Although the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to 
hear FCA cases recently, because of the divergent standards for FCA cases related to 9(b) interpreta-
tion, it seems that this issue is ripe for review. See Jacques Smith & Michael Dearington, Catch Me If 
You Can: The Divergent and Inconstant Pleading Requirements Governing Qui Tam Complaints, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 18, 2014), http://www.arentfox.com/sites/default/files/HFRA.1014.Arentfox.
QuiTam.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/BA2B-DPCN (“[T]he current circuit split has sown a com-
plicated patchwork of federal law for FCA defendants to navigate—one that provides varying degrees 
of defendant protections depending on where the relator files suit—and thus is worthy of Supreme 
Court resolution.”); Genna Steinberg, Third Circuit Adopts Less Rigid Pleading Standard for FCA 
Claims, FCA ALERT (June 16, 2014), http://www.fcaalert.com/2014/06/articles/third-circuit-adopts-
less-rigid-pleading-standard-for-fca-claims/, archived at http://perma.cc/L7E5-6GVL (noting that the 
Third Circuit decision in Foglia deepened the circuit split related to application of Rule 9(b) interpre-
tation, and highlights the need for the Supreme Court to provide guidance). But see Ellyn Sternfield, 
The Supreme Court Continues to Punt on False Claims Cases, MINTZ LEVIN HEALTH LAW & POLICY 
MATTERS (Oct. 7th, 2014), http://www.healthlawpolicymatters.com/2014/10/07/the-supreme-court-
continues-to-punt-on-false-claims-cases/, archived at http://perma.cc/V9JF-UFY7 (describing the 
Supreme Court’s decision to deny certiorari to settle 9(b) particularity divergence in recent cases). 
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based on a more-likely-than-not standard. Those circuits with strict interpreta-
tions of Rule 9(b) inappropriately require plaintiffs to include a level of speci-
ficity in complaints that exceeds that trial standard. The Third Circuit in Foglia 
v. Renal Ventures Management LLC correctly ruled that the presence of facts 
supporting a strong inference and reliable indicia that false claims were sub-
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